October 10, 2010

Coordinating to Protect the Global Climate: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Inequality and Commitment

by Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg and Andreas Löschel

- The Copenhagen Accord has introduced a nonbinding "pledge and review" mechanism where individual countries define voluntary emission reduction targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions before 2020. Can this emergent institution prove successful as a first stage to achieve the required global coordination? Against this background, this paper is concerned with the drivers of cooperation among groups of unrelated individuals faced with a coordination game requiring multilateral effort in order to reach a target and avoid losses to all members.

Tavoni, A., A. Dannenberg and A. Löschel (2010). "Coordinating to Protect the Global Climate: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Inequality and Commitment."ZEW Discussion Paper No. 10-049, Jul 2010.