Malapportionment, Gasoline Taxes, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

by J. Lawrence Broz and Daniel Maliniak

- Malapportionment results in a "rural bias" such that the political system disproportionately represents rural voters. We argue that malapportionment of the electoral system affects both the rate at which governments tax gasoline and the extent to which governments participate in global efforts to ameliorate climate change. Since rural voters in industrialized countries rely more heavily on fossil fuels than urban voters, our prediction is that malapportioned political systems will have lower gasoline taxes, and less commitment to climate change amelioration, than systems with equitable representation of constituents.

Broz, J.L. and D. Maliniak (2009). "Malapportionment, Gasoline Taxes, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." Available at SSRN, Nov 2009.