by Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Romain Duval, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni
- This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a "grand coalition" including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable.
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. De Cian, R. Duval, E. Massetti and M. Tavoni (2009). "The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model." OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 702, June 2009.
