by Clara Villegas
- This paper analyzes the effects of the choice between price-based and quantity-based emission regulations on compliance incentives and social welfare in the presence of incomplete enforcement and technology adoption. We show that in contrast to taxes, the extent of violations under tradable emission permits (TEPs) decreases with the rate of technology adoption.
Villegas, C. (2009). "Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance." Göteborgs Universitet School of Business, Economics and Law, Working Papers in Economics No 368, June 2009.
Climate ChangeS provides researchers with a timely and accurate update of new research papers on the Economics of Climate Change. On a weekly basis, links to the most recent and interesting working papers are aggregated from a variety of sources for easy and convenient reference. The focus is on research at the frontier, with most contributions appearing just a few days after having been released. For this reason, journal articles are not tracked.
June 28, 2009
Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance
Labels:
Cap-and-Trade,
Carbon Tax,
Technological Innovation




