by Thierry Brechet, Johan Eyckmans, François Gerard, Philippe Marbaix, Henry Tulkens and Jean-Pascal Van Ypersele
- This paper analyzes the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. Game theoretical stability concepts are used to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. A minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countrijavascript:void(0)
Publish Postes. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, carbon leakage effects are found to be negligible.
Brechet, T., J. Eyckmans, F. Gerard, P. Marbaix, H. Tulkens and J-P Van Ypersele (2008). "The Impact of the Unilateral EU Commitment on the Stability of International Climate Agreements." CORE Discussion Paper 2008/61, Nov 2008.
